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TRIMMING THE HEDGES:
WHY THE ADOPTION OF WACHTELL, LIPTON,
ROSEN AND KATZ'S ANTI-GOLDEN LEASH
BYLAW IS ILL-ADVISED
SCOTT E. PRINCE*
"Today shareholder activism is ripping through the
boardrooms of public corporations and threatening the
future of American business. "'
I. ABSTRACT
Question: Should publicly traded corporations pass bylaws
prohibiting activist investors from nominating and paying persons to run for
the board? This Note explores this question and ultimately concludes that
corporations should resist adopting such bylaws.
II. INTRODUCTION
The rising prevalence of shareholder activism is evidenced in the
news articles scattered throughout The Wall Street Journal and New York
Times. Studies suggest that shareholder activists are flexing more and more
muscle 2 in an attempt to initiate change within under performing
corporations, all with an eye toward value maximization. Activists, for
example, have recently successfully demanded the disbursement of special
dividends to shareholders when corporations accumulate enormous
amounts of cash.3
* J.D./M.B.A. Candidate at The Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law and
Fisher College of Business, Class of 2016.
1Gretchen Morgenson, Memo to Shareholders: Shut Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2007, at EU1 (quoting Martin Lipton, Partner, Wachtell, Liption, Rosen & Katz,
Keynote Address to 25th Annual Institute on Federal Securities, (Feb. 7, 2007)).2 See SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM INSIGHT (2012).
3 See Noah Buhayar & Zachary Tracer, Einhorn Boosts Apple Stake, Praises
Capital-Return Plan, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2013, 4:21 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-07/einhom-boosts-apple-stake-praises-
capital-retum-plan.html. Apple issued a special fifteen-percent increase dividend
disbursement, in part, because of efforts made by hedge fund manager David
Einhorn. Id.
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For many of these targeted corporations, stock value and overall
profitability have soared above pre-activist levels.4 One way in which
activists advocate for change is through the removal and/or appointment of
new directors. Activists have offered to pay highly qualified individuals to
run for a target's board and, if elected, continue to compensate those
individuals based on corporate or hedge fund performance (known as
"golden leash" payments). For activist-nominated directors, there exists an
incentive to push for riskier corporate behavior in order to increase such
compensation. The question becomes whether activists are merely
concerned with quick, short-term profits to the detriment of the long-term
interests of the remaining shareholders. As activists can initiate corporate
change with only a minority stake, this is a real concern.
This Note explores the topic of shareholder activism. Part III
defines crucial terminology and describes how activists initiate corporate
change. Part IV focuses on the fiduciary duties directors owe to
shareholders and questions whether a legally recognized fiduciary duty
should exist for activists in the interest of the remaining shareholders. These
fiduciary duties are examined under the current Delaware corporate law.
Part V examines the recent proxy battles between the Hess Corporation and
Elliott Management and other similar instances like Jana Partners and
Agrium, Inc., as they provide an appropriate segue into the discussion of
whether corporations should be permitted to prohibit activists from
nominating and paying individuals to run as corporate directors. In Part VI,
this Note ultimately concludes that such activism, to a certain extent, is
beneficial to a corporation. Absent the emergence of concrete evidence
suggesting activists harm their target corporation's long-term growth,
bylaws prohibiting activist-compensated directors would be contrary to
public policy.
III. TERMINOLOGY & DISCUSSION
A. Hedge Funds
A hedge fund is a pooled investment fund that utilizes aggressive
strategies to obtain higher returns. Hedge funds generally charge high fees.
Additionally, hedge funds generally receive twenty percent of the positive
earnings generated from the investment. Thus, unlike mutual fund
managers, hedge fund managers have an added incentive to make especially
risky bets since high risk can lead to higher returns. Hedge funds are not
generally required to make substantial public disclosures. They also are not
permitted to market themselves or accept public money. Consequently, only
accredited entities or wealthy individuals can invest in hedge funds.
4 See James Surowiecki, When Shareholder Activism Goes Too Far, NEW YORKER
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/08/when-
shareholder-activism-goes-too-far.html.
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As hedge funds tend to be more risk acceptant, problems can arise
when they invest substantially in corporations. Target corporations'
management and boards of directors experience headaches attributable to
hedge fund money managers. Hedge funds can implement certain strategies
designed to increase the corporation's share price. Whether or not these
affect the corporation's long-term financial stability is a question discussed
later. For now, it is worth understanding how hedge fund managers
administer their moneymaking strategies.
B. Shareholder Activism
Shareholder activism is the exertion of minority shareholder rights
with the goal of obtaining a high share value.5 Hedge fund money managers
often play the role of shareholder activists. Activists take "sizeable (though
usually minority) stakes in undervalued or struggling companies and then
agitat[e] for change. That change-seeking has typically focused on
management-replacing C.E.O.s or board members--or on what's usually
called 'financial engineering': pushing companies to buy back shares, raise
dividends, sell off underperforming divisions, and so on." 
6
Activists also have the ability to launch proxy campaigns or
threaten lawsuits to remove directors. However, both of these avenues tend
to be exorbitantly expensive. In this context, a proxy is a document that
contains the corporation's relevant business information. Corporations are
required to file proxy statements to their shareholders prior to each annual
shareholder meeting. Proxies can contain anything from the CEO's salary
and benefit package to shareholder proposals.
Because the SEC does not permit shareholders to campaign for
directors on the corporation's proxy statement, shareholders wishing to do
so generally must create their own proxy. Essentially, this entails gathering
the desired information and mailing it out to each individual shareholder.
Proxy battles tend not to be an especially efficient way to unseat directors
or initiate change. As will be discussed below, litigation also suffers from
the same inefficacies and, as a result, is not a highly utilized form of
transformation.
Activist shareholders typically target underperforming, undervalued
corporations. Their ability to effectuate change begins with the purchase of
equity in those target corporations. Strategy plays a role in the accumulation
of such equity, as activists have the option to purchase a certain percentage
of a corporation without having to disclose the transaction. SEC rules
mandate shareholders file a Schedule 13D when their interest in a
corporation reaches a five percent stake; after the five percent ceiling is
5 See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51,56 (2011).
6 See Surowiecki, supra note 4.
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surpassed, shareholders still have ten days to report their interest.7
Ultimately, this allows activists to manipulate the timing of their purchase
to their advantage.
To be sure, activism takes many forms. There are instances in
which activists take rather modest avenues through open communication
with directors and officers. Other times, activists effectuate change by being
an absolute nuisance through proxy battles and litigation. A proxy battle
occurs when activists motivate other dissatisfied shareholders in an effort to
join forces to effectuate change in corporate governance. Proxy battles can
focus energy toward removing directors and officers or forcing alterations
in a corporation's articles and bylaws. Activists often see a change in the
board as an effective way to obtain the desired results. Martin Lipton
compiled a more complete list of devices used by activists on a Harvard
Law School blog, including:
" (a) proposing a precatory proxy resolution for specific
actions prescribed by the activist or the creation of a
special committee of independent directors to undertake
a strategic review for the purpose of "maximizing
shareholder value";
" (b) conducting a proxy fight to get board representation
(note solicitation for a short slate is very often supported
by ISS and when it is, is usually successful) at an annual
or special meeting or through action by written consent;
* (c) orchestrating a withhold the vote campaign;
* (d) aggressively criticizing and opposing a company's
announced initiatives and strategic actions;
" (e) seeking to force a sale by leaking or initiating rumors
of an unsolicited approach, publicly calling for a sale,
acting as an (unauthorized) intermediary with strategic
acquirers and private equity funds or making their own
"stalking horse" bid;
* (f) rallying institutional investors and sell-side research
analysts to support the activist's program;
" (g) using stock loans, options, derivatives and other
devices to increase voting power beyond the activist's
economic equity investment;
" (h) using sophisticated public relations and media
campaigns to advance the activist's arguments;
7 Filing of Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13D (2013); see also Schedule
D, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/sched13.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
2014 Trimming the Hedges: 149
Why the Adoption of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen and Katz's Anti-golden Leash Bylaw is Ill-advised
* (i) hiring private investigators to establish dossiers on
directors, management and key employees and otherwise
conducting aggressive "diligence"; and
S(j) litigating to obtain board records and materials and to
8block transactions.
Further, Lipton warns that defending against shareholder activism is "an art,
not a science." 9
Opponents of shareholder activism argue activist-nominated
directors will be more amenable to the activist's suggestions. Hedge fund
managers, on the other hand, highlight that directors owe fiduciary duties to
the shareholders. Also, once the arrangement is made, hedge fund managers
are contractually obligated to fulfill their side of the contract so the activist-
nominated directors no longer have a direct connection to the hedge fund.
C. Increase in Shareholder Activism
The prevalence of shareholder activism has increased over the past
few decades. Money manager Martin Sosnoff recounts activism in the
1980s: "I essayed corporate activism in the eighties when it was notably
unfashionable for a money manager to do so. You were expected to sell
problematic stocks rather than tussle with mediocre management and go for
control. Clients gave me a hard time, even a scolding."' Times have
changed. The recent financial crisis has frustrated investors more willing to
become involved in those tussles. In a shareholder activism report issued by
the law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel, a shareholder activist explained, "[p]oor
corporate governance is the cause of concern and the main reason behind
increasing shareholder activist activity. Even the largest corporations,
which were once pioneers of management and decision making, have
witnessed constant change in top level management."" Data collected from
1994-2007 shows an exorbitant quantitative increase in 13D filings by
activist hedge funds. In 1994, there were only ten 13D filings; in 2007,
there were 272.12
8 Martin Lipton, Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 21, 2013, 12:24 PM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/11/2 1/dealing-with-activist-hedge-
funds-2/.
9
Id.
10 Martin Sosnoff, Shareholder Activism Is a Shabby Myth, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013,
3:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/martinsosnoff/2013/09/05/shareholder-
activism-is-a-shabby-myth/.
" See SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, supra note 2, at 8.
12 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism 3
(Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 13-66, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=2291577.
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The question remains: however, whether there has been a
qualitative increase in the intervention. That is, whether activists have made
a more aggressive push for the implementation of their policies. The
evidence suggests this, too, has experienced a similar expansion. In the
Schulte report, a private equity investor explained that activists have
"intensified their corporate governance activities and are trying to establish
themselves as sophisticated players in the investment community while
attempting to gain greater involvement in strategic corporate decisions and
control in decision making.' 13 For shareholder activists, the ability to
control how the target operates its business is often essential to realizing
high returns on their investments.
One author writes, "hedge funds with significant shareholdings
have been able to use wolf-pack tactics against companies to achieve at
least some of their aims."' 14 Hedge fund activity in a particular target
corporation can attract more hedge fund managers to that same target. This
has its advantages. It further aligns activists, bringing together their shared
interest in high returns and greater profits. Additional hedge funds mean
greater power to effectuate change. Also, these "wolf-pack tactics" allow
hedge funds the ability to remain under the radar. An individual hedge fund
may buy less than a five percent interest in the target and, thus, does not
have to file a 13D. Essentially, "[t]his kind of close but non-group forming
pseudo-cooperation ... shows how intimate shareholders can get without
running afoul of the rules."' 5 Wolf-pack tactics enable multiple hedge funds
to invest in the same target corporation without having to disclose their
activity. Imagine a scenario in which three, four or five hedge funds each
take sizeable stakes in one target corporation. This 13D bypass is
empowering. This provides activists a sizeable stake in the target.
Assuming three, four or five hedge funds pooled together (if each remained
just below the five percent threshold), this respectively equates to a fifteen,
twenty or twenty-five percent interest in the target. With such substantial
stakes, if the hedge funds aligned their goals, they could instigate enormous
change within the target. Such high percentages would, in certain instances,
make the hedge funds the majority shareholder. Power exists in numbers-
a concept not lost on hedge fund money managers.
This brings into question how activists exert their power in
corporate governance. There are a variety of different ways activists initiate
change. First, "[c]ommunication between shareholders and management
remains the most effective method for activists to achieve their goals.' 16
Open dialogue has the advantage of potentially being less confrontational
13 See SCHULTE RoTH & ZABEL, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting a private equity
investor).
14 Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:
An EmpiricalAnalysis, 32 J. CoRP. L. 681, 721 (2007).
'" Id. at 698.
16 See SCHULTE RoTH & ZABEL, supra note 2, at 7.
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and more amicable, allowing for greater efficiency. At times, activists often
have a greater chance of getting their way if they approach the intervention
in a more diplomatic fashion. Chris Cernich, head of the M&A proxy-
contest research at Institutional Shareholder Services, claims, "'The least
effective way to do activism these days is to come in with a big club." '" 7
However, in the case of Elliott Management and Jana Partners (discussed
below), communication was not effective. In those instances, bitter fights
over control of the target ensued. The question remains what happens when
neither party is interested in communicating with the other side.
In the event communication fails, an activist has more aggressive,
more expensive avenues available. An activist may, for instance, choose to
launch a public campaign in opposition against the board of directors or
commence a proxy battle. However, these are becoming less prevalent as
they can be very expensive and time consuming. Bill Ackman
acknowledges that "'[n]obody wants to have a public battle ... We prefer
to work with boards in making changes that increase shareholder value, but
sometimes you have to go to the mat."",18 Given that Ackman estimates his
Canadian Pacific proxy battle cost him up to fifteen million dollars, 19 it is
no wonder that open,free communication with the board is preferred.
Diane Brady, a senior editor for Businessweek, believes that the
increase in shareholder activism is aided by a change in the public's
attitude.20 She writes, "[a]ll the tools once used to avert activists in the
boardroom, from poison pills that avert takeovers to golden parachutes that
enrich management, are seen as negatives for shareholders. Outrage over
executive compensation, cozy boards, and lax oversight has also shifted
views of activism. ''2 The public's tolerance, however, only goes so far.
Brady concedes, "[m]any investors remain wary about both the motives and
the techniques of those seeking big changes in pursuit of big profits. 2
Another tactic hedge fund activists deploy involves direct
representation on the target's board of directors. If a hedge fund
successfully gains direct board representation, the approach changes.23 Such
direct representation will be discussed later, using Hess Corporation and
Elliott Management as an example. For now, it is worth noting the
strategies activists may employ in order to increase their value. First,
activists can reduce the target's cash by increasing its leverage and pay
17 Diane Brady, The Good Barbarian: How Icahn, Ackman, and Loeb Became
Shareholder Heroes, BUSNESSWEEK (May 14, 2012),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-14/the-good-barbarian-how-icahn-
ackman-and-loeb-became-shareholder-heroes.
18 id.
19Id.
20 Id.
21 Id
22 Id.
23 See Briggs, supra note 14, at 717.
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higher or special dividends.2 4 For example, David Einhorn recently argued
that Apple should issue a dividend disbursement to its shareholders or
disburse a new preferred stock.25 At one time, Apple had more than $144.7
billion 26 available and Einhorn believed the shareholders were owed a
portion.27 The second common tactic utilized by activists involves lowering
the target's capital expenditures, as well as their research and development
expenditures.
Regardless of why activism has proliferated, the fact remains that
there has been an increase in such activism. There also remains a very real
divide as to whether activism is financially beneficial or detrimental for a
target's long-term shareholders. The Note now addresses this issue.
D. Shareholder Activism Critics
Critics of shareholder activism point to the idea of myopic returns.
Essentially the belief is that "improved performance following activist
interventions comes at the expense of sacrificing performance later on, and
short-term positive stock reactions merely reflect inefficient market prices
that are moved by the short-term changes and fail to reflect their long-term
costs. ' '28 As one of the arguments goes, the markets immediately react to
the announcement of hedge fund investment in the target. This positive
reaction artificially inflates the target's stock price above the true value of
the corporation. When the dust settles, the target's shareholders are left with
overvalued stock that will inevitably drop, whether for reasons of natural
stock market correction or for reasons more directly related to the hedge
fund's future activity. Examples of activism that are detrimental to the
target's health follow.
One problem, critics argue, is that activists are capable of
manipulating corporate governance in a way that favors quick returns. 29 For
example, as discussed above, activists have successfully forced targets to
24 Apri Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge
Funds and Other Private Investors 4 (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 06-
41, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=913362.
25 AppleInsider Staff, Hedge Fund Manager David Einhorn Sues Apple Over
$137B Cash Hoard, APPLEINSIDER (Feb. 7, 2013, 11:30 AM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/1 3/02/07/hedge-fund-manager-david-einhorn-sues-
apple-over- 137b-cash-hoard.2 Steve Schaefer, Paging David Einhorn: Apple Hikes Dividend, Supersizes
Buyback as Cash Swells to $145B, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2013, 5:55 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2013/04/23/paging-david-einhom-
apple-raises-dividend-ups-buyback-as-cash-swells-to- 1 45b.
2 Michael J. de la Merced, Einhorn Supports Apple's Big Payouts, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 23, 2013, 6:57 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/einhom-supports-apples-big-
payouts/?_php--true&_type=blogs& r=0.See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12.29 See generally id.
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disburse special, unplanned dividends.30 Critics argue that intervention such
as this puts the target's long-term health at risk because those funds,
instead, should be held for potential investing or for further research and
development.31 One opponent remarked, "To build wealth in a durable
manner, corporations need to commit capital to long-term endeavors, often
involving a lag time between the investment of capital and the achievement
of profit, a long time during which activities like research and development
occur." 32 Shareholder activism threatens this durability.
Critics also argue that shareholder-activist intervention imposes an
unstable "democratic" approach to corporate governance.33 Delaware
Chancellor Leo Strine believes that if
corporations become direct democracies, where every
action of management is the subject of a stockholder
plebiscite, the time and attention of managers will be
increasingly diverted from profit-producing activities into
more "political" activities centered on addressing referenda
items propounded by particular stockholders, who often
have no long-term commitment to remaining as
stockholders and who owe other stockholders no fiduciary
duties.34
Critics such as Chancellor Strine argue that corporations must resemble
more of a republic in order to fully benefit from the board's expertise and
insight. 35 That is, boards and officers have clearly distinct roles and their
ability to carry forward their plan uninterrupted, subject to their fiduciary
duties, is critical for a corporation's long-term health. Simply, corporate
law vests managerial power to the board of directors-not the
stockholders.36
A transformation in this paradigm disrupts the board's ability to
remain attentive to shareholder interests. Shareholder activism shifts the
power from the board to a more limited body (i.e., hedge fund money
managers) without the legal responsibility to the remaining parties.37 Critics
argue that activists proffering long-term corporate governance strategies
should have a substantial long-term incentive to keep their interests
properly aligned with the remaining stockholders. The liquidity of publicly
traded stock opens the avenue for activists to "pump and dump." That is,
3 0 See generally Klein & Zur, supra note 24.
31 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question
We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. LAW. 1, 3 (2010).
32Id.
33 See generally id.34 Id at 4.
35 See generally id36 id.
37 See discussion infra Part IV.
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activists can invest their money short term, enact short-term strategies,
watch the stock price soar and then sell off their interest without regard to
the long-term finances of both the corporation and the remaining
stockholders.
1. Negative Examples of Shareholder Activism
There have been instances that activists push for even more change.
Activist Bill Ackman has taken particularly tenacious approaches. His
handling of Target and JCPenney evidences his hands-on approach.38
Ackman heads Pershing Square Capital Management, a company managing
"pooled investment vehicles for high net worth individuals and institutional
investors' 39 with a portfolio value of approximately twelve billion dollars.40
In 2007, Ackman invested approximately two billion dollars in
Target, the well-known retailer.41 Then a three percent owner of the
company, Ackman launched a proxy campaign to replace five incumbents
with other candidates-including himself.42 The proxy battle came as a
surprise to many on Wall Street as Target was then "the only major retailer
[thriving] while going head to head with one of the world's most
formidable companies: Wal-Mart Stores. ' ' 3 The company battled back and,
ultimately, none of Ackman's nominated candidates were elected.
44
Throughout this process, Ackman's portfolio took a loss. Ninety
percent of his initial two billion dollar investment was lost as Target's share
price plummeted fifty percent.45 When Ackman originally purchased equity
in Target, the price per stock was approximately $60.17.46 Ackman finally
sold all of his interest in Q1 of 2011-shares traded around $56.75.47
Though Ackman's portfolio, on a broader scale, boasts success, his
endeavor in Target certainly did not show the return he originally imagined.
38 See Joe Weisenthal, Bill Ackman Wants Everyone Who Says He's a Destroyer of
Companies to See This Chart, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2013, 4:25 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/performance-of-bill-ackman-activist-investments-
2013-8.
39 See generally id.
40 William Ackman, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/william-ackman/ (last
updated Apr. 16, 2014, 8:55 PM).
4 Katherine Burton, Ackman Seeks to Raise Fund for Unnamed Activist Stake,
BLOOMBERG (Jul. 8, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-
08/ackman-raises-money-for-activist-stake-in-large-company.html.
42 Andrew Bary, Ackman's Target Campaign Is Off-Target, BARRON'S (May 25,
2009, 11:59 PM), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB124303588507648835.html.
43 Id.
44 Bill Catlin, Target Shareholders Reject Ackman's Board Slate, MPR NEWS (May
28, 2009, 5:23 PM),
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/05/28/target shareholdersreject ackman.
45 Id.; see also Weisenthal, supra note 38.
46 See Weisenthal, supra note 38.
47 id.
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Ackman suffered similar woes with his aggressive campaign in
JCPenney. Ackman originally purchased JCPenney stock in Q3 of 201 048
when the shares were trading at twenty-five dollars. 49 He spearheaded the
campaign to bring in Ron Johnson, former Apple retail chief, as CEO.
During Johnson's seventeen-month stint as JCPenney's CEO, sales fell
twenty-five percent and the company netted a loss of 985 million dollars.5 °
Skeptics of Ackman claim his handling of the retailer ruined the
corporation and, as a result, destroyed jobs.5' One critic noted, "Instead of
simply focusing on financial engineering, he set out to remake the entire
business, giving it a new strategic direction, revamping its stores, and
changing its customer base." 52 JCPenney's extensive transformation was
fueled by Ackman's vision.53 Despite his critics, Ackman claimed, "As the
largest shareholder of JCPenney, I only have one goal: help save one of the
great iconic American companies., 54 He was unsuccessful; he recently
dumped all of his 39.1 million shares of JCPenney for $12.90 a share,
resulting in an approximate loss of 473 million dollars.55 After the sale, the
market responded, adding insult to injury: JCPenney stock witnessed a
4.1% gain.
56
48 Buy/Sell Activity: Bill Ackman - Pershing Square Capital Management
DATAROMA, http://www.dataroma.com/m/mactivity.php?m=psc&typ=a&L=2
[hereinafter DATAROMA] (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
49 See Michael J. de la Merced, His Links Severed, Ackman Sells Stake in J. C.
Penney, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 5:22 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/ackman-moves-to-sell-stake-in-j-c-
0enney/.
"Abram Brown, J. C. Penney Is Awash in Red Ink: $552 Million Q4 Loss and
Customer Flight, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013, 6:56 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/02/27/j-c-penney-posts-wider-than-
expected-552-million-loss-holiday-sales-fell-28/. The Johnson era was so negative
that JCPenney actually released a commercial apologizing to its customers. See
Clare O'Connor, J. C. Penney Releases Apology Ad Begging Shoppers to Come
Back, FORBES (May 1, 2013, 2:49 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2013/05/0 1/j-c-penney-releases-
apology-ad-begging-shoppers-to-come-back/.
See Weisenthal, supra note 45.
52 See Surowiecki, supra note 4.
53 Id.
54 See Suzanne Kapner & Emily Glazer, Investor William Ackman Targets J. C.
Penney's CEO, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2013, 9:33 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014241278873234776045790006913996
43208.
55 See Emily Glazer et al., Ackman Moves to Dump Entire Stake in J. C. Penney,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2013 8:21 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014241278873245912045790372511351
14142.
56 See David Benoit, With Ackman Gone, J. C. Penney Enjoys One of Best Days of
2013, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2013, 12:39 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/08/27/with-ackman-gone-j-c-penney-enjoys-
one-of-best-days-of-2013/?KEYWORDS=ackman+jcpenney.
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E. Shareholder Activism Advocates
On a broader scope, advocates argue shareholder activism increases
shareholder returns by encouraging targets to better manage their assets.
Specifically, Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Bray and Wei Jiang answered Lipton's
challenge by authoring an article providing the first empirical analysis of
activists' effects on long-term profitability. 57 Their regressions provide that
shareholder activism actually increases both short- and long-term value. 8
Because critics argue shareholder activists spike current share prices to the
detriment of long-term growth, the authors especially focused on such
claim.59 They conclude, "[w]e find no evidence that interventions are
followed by declines in operating performance in the long term; to the
contrary, activist interventions are followed by improved operating
performance during the five-year period following these interventions. 6 °
The authors concede the critics are correct about one thing:
shareholder activist intervention tends to create an initial upward surge in
the target's stock price.61 Their findings suggest that "[t]here is evidence
that Schedule 13D filings-public disclosures of the purchase of a
significant stake by an activist-are accompanied by significant positive
price reactions as well as subsequent improvements in operating
performance. 62 The mere announcement of a shareholder activist staking a
claim in the target company produces approximately a six percent increase
in stock price.63 Other studies indicate similar stock tendencies. For
instance, one paper found that hedge fund activism earns a 10.2% average
abnormal stock return during the period immediately following a Schedule
1 3D filing.64 Further, the authors found that targeted companies earned an
additional 11.4% of abnormal returns a year following the Schedule 13D
filing.65 These positive finds are consistent with Bebchuck, Brav and Jiang
though they only extend a year following the initial activism.
66
Critics and advocates draw entirely different conclusions from
these results. For instance, critics like Lipton dismiss the stock spikes as
insignificant.67 Opponents argue that the initial stock price increase is more
than cancelled out by the negative long-term returns, leaving the remaining
shareholders out of luck.68 However, not only do the authors find no
57 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 12.
58 See generally id.
59 Id.60 Id. (in Abstract).
61 Id. at 16.
62Id. at2.
63 Bebchuk et al., supra note 12, at 16.
64 See Klein & Zur, supra note 24, at 44.61 Id. at3.
66 See generally Bebchuck et al., supra note 12.
67 See generally Lipton, supra note 8.
68 See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 17.
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evidence of activist-caused declines in long-term performance, they find
"clear patterns of improved operating performance relative to industry peers
during the five years following activist interventions." 69 Thus, targeted
shareholder activist companies are actually outperfonning other companies
within the same industry during the five-year period.
1. Positive Examples of Shareholder Activism
To be fair, Ackman's successes greatly outnumber his failures. In
2005, Ackman invested in McDonald's Corporation. 0 The stock traded at
$28.98 the day before his initial acquisition. 71 As of March 17, 2014,
McDonald's stock trades at $97.60.72 Similarly, Ackman's investment in
Procter & Gamble Co. was prosperous. The stock traded at $64.51 the day
before his initial acquisition in May 4, 2012.73 As of March 17, 2014, P&G
stock trades at $79.84, over a twenty-three percent increase in under two
years.74 Recently, Ackman's Pershing Square sold a majority of its interest
in P&G.75 Before Pershing Square dumped a majority of its stock, Ackman
agitated change within the company. He "successfully pushed for the
changes, and shares reacted favorably, scoring him a big win.",76 Among
these changes was Ackman's ability to replace P&G's CEO Robert
McDonald with A.G. Lafley.77
The stock prices of General Growth Properties are especially
revealing. Ackman originally invested in the company in 2008 when the
stock price traded at $0.35 per share.78 As of March 17, 2014, the stock
trades at $20.74. 79 Though causation cannot be logically discerned from
these interactions, the correlation is nonetheless impressive. Ackman still
69 1d. at 10.
70 Chris Burritt & Katherine Burton, Bill Ackman Sells McDonald's Stake After
Stock Surges (Update4), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2007, 4:08 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aZ6kcnn5qqUo.71 See Weisenthal, supra note 38.
72 McDonald's Corporation, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lcddata.html?ticker=mcd (last visited Mar. 17,
2014).
73 See Weisenthal, supra note 38.
74 Procter & Gamble Co., NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/pg.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).75 See DATAROMA, supra note 48.
76 David Benoit, Pershing Square Cuts Size of Procter & Gamble Common Stake
by 76%, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2013, 6:07 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/11/14/pershing-square-cuts-size-of-procter-
amble-common-stake-by-76/?KEYWORDS=ackman+procter.
Jeremy Bogaisky, Congrats, Bill Ackman: Bob McDonald Out at P&G, A. G.
Lafley Returning as CEO, FORBES (May 23, 2013, 6:57 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ eremybogaisky/2013/05/23/bob-mcdonald-out-at-
procter-a-g-lafley-retuming-as-ceo/.
8 See Weisenthal, supra note 38.
9 General Growth Properties, NYSE EURONEXT,
http://www.nyse.com/listed/ggp.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
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maintains an interest in General Growth, but Pershing Square's absolute
interest is decreasing. What is interesting is that, consistent with Bebchuk,
Brav and Jiang's finding, Ackman's successful interventions have not led to
material declines in stock price as his interest diminishes. Perhaps not
enough time has passed for negative consequences to surface, but as of yet,
the target companies appear stable.
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
1. Fiduciary Duties Directors Owe to Shareholders
Hedge fund activists target companies organized in the corporate
form. The corporate structure allows ordinary investors to buy a limited-
liability interest in the company. Thus, the owners (the shareholders) and
the management (directors and officers) are separate entities. For this
reason, there exist fiduciary duties that help police and, ideally, ensure that
management acts in the interest of the shareholders.80 Generally, these
fiduciary duties include a duty of loyalty and care, which prevent
management from engaging in self-dealing transactions that serve to benefit
the directors and officers rather than the shareholders." Avoiding these
forms of self interest is at the heart of why fiduciary duties exist.82 What
these duties entail and how they are applied is an essential element to this
Note. Decades of case law elucidates where courts generally find
shareholders are protected. As will be discussed, the business judgment rule
often serves as management's greatest defense against breach of fiduciary
duty claims.83
The business judgment rule serves to insulate management from
overly extensive liability. 84 The business judgment rule provides a judicial
presumption that the directors have acted in accordance with their fiduciary
duties of care, loyalty and good faith.85 This rule allows directors to make
business decisions they truly believe will benefit the company.86 Such
decisions often involve risk, and the business judgment rule curbs certain
litigation, allowing management to take a necessary amount of risk.87
As mentioned, the business judgment rule provides a presumption
of lawful behavior.88 Thus, the burden of proof rests on the shareholder to
80 See Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity
Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 521, 524 (2013).
81 Id. at 531-33.
82 See id at 531.
83 See generally id
'See id. at 521.85 See id. at 524.
86 See id. at 565.
87 See id. at 565-66.
88 See generally id.
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demonstrate that management acted to the contrary of such presumption.89
In Shlensky v. Wrigley, the court held that absent a showing of "fraud,
illegality or conflict of interest," the business judgment rule applies.90 This
holding indicates the difficulty shareholders may have in overcoming the
business judgment rule.
For example, in Shlensky, the shareholders sued the directors of
Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. for failing to install lights at
Wrigley Field. Without lights, the Chicago Cubs were unable to hold night
games during the week. The plaintiffs argued this resulted in lower
attendance during the week and, consequently, lower profits. The plaintiffs
also alleged that the defendant "refused to install lights, not because of
interest in the welfare of the corporation but because of his personal
opinions 'that baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the installation of lights
and night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect upon the
surrounding neighborhood.' 91 Thus, the directors admitted their decision
was not based upon the financial wellbeing of the corporation; rather, the
directors believed their decision would benefit the corporation in other
ways. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the business judgment rule
protected the directors because the shareholders failed to establish the
directors' decision was colored with "fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest. '92 This decision suggests the business judgment rule protects
management to a high degree.
Although the business judgment rule insulates management very
well, management must consider shareholders before the interests of any
other constituencies. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, the court ruled on
exactly this issue.9 3 Henry Ford refused to issue a dividend to the
shareholders, claiming he wanted to use the money to invest in additional
machinery as well as share the company's earnings with the general
public.94 His strategy unarguably lowered the company's profits. Ford
wanted to continue Ford Motor Co. "as a semi-eleemosynary institution and
not as a business institution." 95 The court held:
[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors
to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the
primary purpose of benefiting others, and no one will
contend that, if the avowed purpose of the defendant
89 See id at 529-30.
' 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).91 Id. at 778.
92 Id. at 780.
93 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).94 Id. at 671.
95Id. at 683.
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directors was to sacrifice the interests of shareholders, it
would not be the duty of the courts to interfere.96
Though this decision does not specifically rule on the business judgment
rule, it does illustrate that a corporation's management must act within a
certain legal boundary. In essence, the shareholder constituency is of
primary concern-even if finances are not a decision's driving factor.
Relevant to the discussion then is the fiduciary duty of care. In Joy
v. North,97 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote, "the business
judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its existence.
Thus, it does not apply in cases.., in which the corporate decision lacks a
business purpose, . . . [or] is tainted by a conflict of interest." 98 The "tainted
by a conflict of interest" is especially pertinent to the discussion of hedge
fund-appointed directors. For now, the duty of care is discussed in the
traditional sense.
The issue of decisional duty of care was discussed in Smith v. Van
Gorkom.99 In this case, shareholders brought suit against the directors,
claiming they failed to accurately determine the company's value prior to
sale.'00 The corporation's directors relied almost exclusively on Van
Gorkom, the chairman and CEO. 10' The court determined the concept of
gross negligence was the standard applicable to decisional duty of care.102
The court then found the directors breached this duty because they "(1) did
not adequately inform themselves . . . (2) were uninformed as to the
intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances, at a
minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the 'sale' of the Company
upon two hours' consideration.' 0 3 Thus, the court determined the directors
could not rely on the protection of the business judgment rule because they
did not base their decision on sufficient facts.'04
Since the Van Gorkom decision, however, statutes were amended to
limit its scope. The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section
141 was altered to further protect directors, stating in pertinence:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any
committee designated by the board of directors, shall, in
the performance of such member's duties, be fully
protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the
corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or
96 Id. at 684.
97 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).98 Id. at 886 (internal citations omitted).
99 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
'
0 Id. at 876.
'0' Id. at 877.
102 Id. at 873.
' Id. at 874.
o4 Id. at 874, 888.
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statements presented to the corporation by any of the
corporation's officers or employees, or committees of the
board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the
member reasonably believes are within such other person's
professional or expert competence and who has been
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the
corporation. 105
The extension of such permissible reliance is in accordance with
the spirit of the DGCL. Indeed, Delaware's laws generally provide directors
with a great deal of discretion. 0 6 Board protection allows directors to
engage in riskier transactions that yield higher returns to the stockholders.
Because stockholders have the ability to diversify their portfolios, they
should, in theory, be financially capable of assuming more risk.
2. Should Activist Shareholders Owe Fiduciary Duties to the Other
Shareholders?
As the above indicates, director-shareholder fiduciary duties are
essentially set in stone. The more interesting question, then, is whether
corporate law should recognize the increased prevalence of shareholder
activism and adjust its law in the face of changed circumstances. As
activists exert more control through unseating directors and replacing them
with individuals of their choosing, the traditional corporate separation of
ownership (shareholders) and managers (directors and officers) begins to
deteriorate. This blurred distinction requires an examination into whether
activists themselves should assume fiduciary duties to the remaining
shareholders. The Note now turns to this issue.
Fiduciary duties are usually reserved for the directors and officers
of the corporations. Courts have, however, held that certain types of
shareholders also owe fiduciary duties to the remaining shareholders. For
instance, "courts have held that majority shareholders, like corporate
officers and directors, owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority
shareholders that precludes them from using their positions as controlling
shareholders to extract material economic benefits from the firm at the
minority's expense."'0 7 The California Supreme Court decided, "[a]ny use
to which [majority shareholders] put the corporation or their power to
control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately."'' 0 8 A
common example of majority shareholders forcing an issue is embodied in
a freeze out. Freeze-out statutes vary by state. Pertinent to this Note is
105 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2014).
106 Marilyn French & Scott Mazur, Leveraged Recapitalizations: There Is Such a
Thing as Being Too Rich and Too Thin, WElL (Mar. 2004),
http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8855.
107 Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1265 (2008) (citations omitted).
108 Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969).
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DGCL section 253. Under DGCL section 253, a parent corporation owning
at least ninety percent of a subsidiary may merge the subsidiary into the
parent (an upstream merger).'0 9 The parent corporation does not need the
subsidiary's consent for the merger."0 The parent corporation's board also
may execute the transaction without shareholder ratification.
In certain instances, these minority shareholders are not without
remedy. If the squeezed-out minority shareholders do not like the price per
share offered, they may seek relief by claiming the directors, officers or
majority shareholders breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty:
Freeze-outs present an obvious danger to minority
shareholders because the controlling shareholder can use its
position to effectuate the transaction at an unfairly low
price. As an example, suppose a parent company seeks to
acquire 100% of the equity of a partially owned subsidiary
which it holds 60% of the outstanding shares. In such a
case, the parent has an incentive to set the merger price as
low as possible because every $1 reduction in the merger
price saves the controlling shareholder $1 while costing the
controlling shareholder only 60 cents. Courts have not
hesitated to declare that controlling shareholders owe
loyalty duties to minority shareholders in these
circumstances and to subject freeze-outs to judicial scrutiny
under the heightened standard of intrinsic fairness."'
The burden of proof is placed on the controlling shareholders to show the
transaction is intrinsically fair." 2 Essentially, those majority shareholders
"must prove to the court's satisfaction that the transaction took place at a
'fair price' and that it was accomplished through 'fair dealing.""'11
3
In addition to these fiduciary duties, minority shareholders, in
certain instances, may also exert appraisal rights. Appraisal rights allow
shareholders to challenge the consideration received for their stock as too
low. Exercising appraisal rights can be effective. Greenlight Capital LLC
was awarded a price 270% over the per share value of the original offered
merger price. 14 Similarly, Prescott Group was awarded a 455% premium
for their shares in The Coleman Company." 5 Other examples exist where
109 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253.
"10 Id.
11 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 107, at 1271-72 (citations omitted).2 1d. at 1264.
"13 Id. at 1266.114 See Joseph Glatt, Is it Worth it? The Value of Delaware Appraisal Rights to the
Activist Investor, ACTIVIST INVESTING DEVELOPMENTS (Summer 2007), available
at http://www.srz.com/files/News/ebd7562a-5d91-41 ec-84c2-
4b2b28Of80dc/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fcf3914f-2885-4af4-b24a-
23804876290f/filesfilesActivist summer07_1_Is it worthit.Glatt.pdf.115 Id
2014 Trimming the Hedges: 163
Why the Adoption of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen and Katz's Anti-golden Leash Bylaw is Ill-advised
simply threatening exercising appraisal rights led to an increase in the
original consideration offered. 16 Unlike a derivative lawsuit, however, the
corporation is not responsible for the attorney fees of shareholders seeking
appraisal rights. An additional risk of exercising appraisal rights is that the
Chancery Court can award the shareholder a price per share that is lower
than the price originally offered.
These fiduciary duties, however, mostly relate to directors or
officers that own a majority of the corporation's stock-instances most
likely involving closely held corporations rather than public corporations. It
is less clear how courts will rule if a minority shareholder such as a hedge
fund exerts the power. For example, DGCL section 253 only pertains to
majority shareholders that are directors and officers of the corporation" 17
No DGCL provision speaks specifically to minority control, leaving the
uncertainty to case law. Minority shareholders who do not have a
controlling vote may still be subject to fiduciary duties if they have the
ability to exercise de facto control. The case law suggests, however, that
those shareholders must "own[] enough voting shares to allow [them] to
dictate membership on the board."
' 18
In In re Cysive, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware
Chancery Court spoke to this issue.' 19 The defendant owned roughly forty
percent of the voting equity in the publicly traded company. 20 In
determining whether the defendant was a controlling shareholder, then-Vice
Chancellor Leo Strine found that had the defendant "become[] dissatisfied
with the independent directors, his voting power position[ed] him well to
elect a new slate more to his liking without having to attract much, if any,
support from public stockholders.' 12 ' Essentially, "the threat of 'inherent
coercion' that [the defendant] presents to the independent directors and
public stockholders of Cysive" indicated a controlling vote.1
22
Notably, this ordinarily does not pertain to hedge fund activists as
they effectuate change without the clear voting power to do so. Although
courts today would not likely deem hedge fund activists controlling
shareholders, they nonetheless are able to control certain corporate actions.
There always exists the possibility the Chancery may eventually hold that
activists possess enough control to draw them into the "controlling
shareholder" realm. As mentioned, activists have successfully campaigned
for a director seat on numerous occasions. In no known case, however, have
activists enjoyed enough power to "elect a new slate" of directors. Some
116 Id
"I DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2014).
118 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 107, at 1270.
"9 836 A.2d 531 (Del. Ch. 2003).120 Id. at 535.
21 Id. at 552.
122 See id.
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critics of hedge fund activism believe stricter laws should be set in place in
order to alleviate what they believe is a problem.
Critics note that one detriment of hedge fund activism is "the
problem of reining in minority shareholder opportunism in public
corporations as shareholders become more powerful and more diverse."' 2 3
Critics point out that hedge fund activists are nothing short of creative.
Activists have thus far been able to elude strict corporate law limitations
through adaptation and strategic innovation. As a response, some critics
advocate that shareholders have latent fiduciary duties to one another. In
particular:
These latent duties would be triggered whenever a
particular shareholder-whether or not it is technically a
shareholder capable of controlling the boards' decisions as
to all matters-in fact manages to successfully influence
the company's actions with regard to a particular issue in
which that shareholder as a material, personal economic
interest. In other words, we believe that it is now time to
expand both our notions of when a shareholder should be
deemed to have "control" and our conception about the
kinds of circumstances in which the exercise of that control
poses a threat to the firm or to other shareholders.1 24
Thus, there are critics that believe fiduciary duties need an overhaul
extension that would bring all shareholders into its restrictive rule.
This conclusion presupposes activism as adverse to a corporation's
health. However, in The Long-term Effects of Shareholder Activism, the
authors indicate quite the opposite.125 Also, authors Anabtawi and Stout
argue that "the duty of loyalty should be activated by any factual
situation-including, but not limited to, freeze-outs and closely held
corporations-in which a shareholder seeks to promote a corporate strategy
or transaction in which that particular shareholder has a material, personal
pecuniary interest. ' ' 26 This proposition is potentially dangerous for multiple
reasons.
First, no comprehensive quantitative study exists that indicates
hedge fund activism creates the adverse consequences feared by activism's
critics. Given that activism is responsible for substantial increases in
shareholder value, drastic measures altering current fiduciary duties are
unwarranted and could therefore cause more harm than good. Second, this
proposal would open the door for a substantial increase in shareholder
litigation, as a majority of transactions are implemented with an eye toward
123 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 107, at 1294.
124 Id. at 1295.
125 See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 12.
126 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 107, at 1295-96.
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financial gain. By its very nature, investment in a corporation gives rise to
"personal pecuniary interest[s]' ' 127 for each and every shareholder.
It is nearly impossible to distinguish a shareholder's investment
from anything other than a financial stake. For this reason, any dissatisfied
shareholder could file a lawsuit against an active shareholder. An increase
in litigation is problematic for a variety of reasons. If the burden of proof
remains on the defendants and courts determine that intrinsic fairness
applies (rather than the business judgment rule), a defendant could
presumably only defeat those allegations after discovery. 128 Discovery
expenses are certainly not nominal. With the possibility of costly discovery
hanging over defendants' heads, undeserved settlements may proliferate.
Courts have certainly been hesitant to expand allowable claims in areas of
securities litigation, especially when opening up the gates subjects
defendants to expensive discovery costs. 29 Nevertheless, the threat of such
high discovery is a possibility if the Chancery or Delaware Legislature
permits these types of actions to continue forward.
VI. ELLIOTT MANAGEMENT & JANA PARTNERS
Hess Corporation is "a leading global independent energy company
primarily engaged in the exploration and production of crude oil and natural
gas ... and marketing petroleum products, natural gas and electricity.'
' 30
As of April 15, 2014, Hess stock trades at $85.34 per share, making it the
third-highest share price compared to other industry leaders such as
Chevron ($119.38), Exxon Mobil ($97.34) and ConocoPhillips ($73.11).'3'
As of that date, Hess's market capitalization was approximately twenty-six
billion dollar.1
32
Earlier this year, the hedge fund, Elliott Management, voiced its
dissatisfaction with Hess, claiming the corporation, under the guidance of
the current board of directors, was underperforming relative to its peers. 133
121 Id. at 1296.
128 See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). The
intrinsic fairness test applies if there is a controlling or dominating shareholder in
transactions such as freeze outs. See id. at 720. However, it is unclear whether this
test would apply to an activist shareholder that holds less than a quantitatively
controlling amount. The intrinsic fairness test requires both fair dealing and a fair
price to minority shareholders in such a transaction. See id. at 717.
29 Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). Though these cases pertain to
Rule lOb-5 claims for fraud, the overall sentiment is relevant to the instant issue.
130 Investors, HESS, http://www.hess.com/investors/default.aspx (last visited Apr.
16, 2014).131 Hess Corporation Stock Comparison, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/hes/stock-comparison (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).132 Id.
133 Elliott Management Files Proxy Materials for Hess Shareholders, Bus. WIRE
(Apr. 4, 2013, 8:32 AM),
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Wanting to remedy the problem, Elliott Management nominated five
candidates for Hess's fourteen-member board, hoping to gain more control
over the corporation's strategy and increase profits. 134 Elliott Management
offered to compensate these candidates, once through the corporation and
again through the hedge fund pursuant to one condition: substantial
increases in shareholder and corporate value.135 The proposed compensation
was generous. Elliott offered each director-nominee $50,000 to run and an
additional $30,000 per percentage point Hess's stock price outperformed its
competitors' prices.
136
Jana Partners also made headlines in its proxy battle with Agrium,
Inc. Jana Partners acquired a 7.5% interest in the Canadian-based
agricultural supply company prior to the battle that ensued. 3 7 Like Elliott
Management's contention with Hess, Jana Partners claimed Agrium was
not reaching its potential. In this case, Jana Partners "contends Agrium has
underperformed its peers by 160% over the last five years.' 38 Jana Partners
decided to nominate five directors to Agrium's twelve-member board. 39 Its
golden leash, unlike Elliott Management's, offered the nominees additional
compensation based on the hedge fund's performance. As such, Jana
Partner's nominees stood in line for substantial profits that had the potential
to dwarf the compensation Elliott Management offered. 140 The Jana
Partners nominees each received $50,000 along with 2.6% of the hedge
fund's net profits derived from increases of Agrium's share price.
14 1
Both Elliott Management and Jana Partners' bonus compensation
proposals fell through. 142 Elliott Management nonetheless gained three of
the five sought-after board seats. 143 Jana Partners was not successful in
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130404005734/en/Elliott-
Management-Files-Proxy-Materials-Hess-Shareholders#.Uydx4tyaLwl.
134 See Matthew Rocco, Elliott Nominates 5 to Hess Board, Fox Bus. (Jan. 29,
2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2013/01/29/elliott-nominates-5-to-
hess-board/.
135 See Steven M. Davidoff, Upping the Ante in a Play for a Stronger Board, N.Y.
TIMEs DEALBOOK (Apr. 2, 2013, 6:31 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/upping-the-ante-in-a-play-for-a-stronger-
board/?_php--true&type=blogs&_r=0.
136 id.
137 id.
138 id.
139 id.
140 See id.
141 Id.
142 David Gelles, A Debate over Paying Board Nominees ofActivist Funds, N.Y.
TIMEs DEALBOOK (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:24 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/a-debate-over-paying-board-nominees-of-
activist-funds/? r=0.
143 Michael J. de la Merced, How Elliott and Hess Settled a Bitter Proxy Battle,
N.Y. TMEs DEALBOOK (May 16, 2013, 9:11 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/hess-and-elliott-settle-fight-over-
companys-board/.
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earning any board seats.144 Importantly, the hedge funds' proposals drew
criticism as "the prospect of such incentives upset the stuffy world of
corporate governance. And the simmering dispute around director
compensation from third parties is the latest front in the growing war of
influence being waged between activist hedge funds and corporate
boards.' 45 At first glance, the proposed bonuses might not appear
controversial since the hedge-fund-backed directors only receive additional
compensation if the company's "stock rose sharply"' 46 (or, in Jana Partner's
case, the hedge fund's value increased). The investment world, however,
was all but silent.
As mentioned, the issue is myopic versus non-myopic corporate
strategy implemented by these new directors. Simply put, hedge-fund-
backed directors have a real incentive to advocate for more short-term
direction in an effort to boost stock price quickly. 147 Corporations worry
that golden leashes, as explained, will seek only short-term profits, cut all
ties to the corporation and then run to the nearest bank. These directors, for
instance, can opt to sell off the corporation's assets or promote the
disbursement of excessive dividends. 48 In either case, as the argument
goes, the corporation's long-term health is jeopardized because lower cash
holdings can affect the corporation's stability. These cash reserves could be
used to reinvest in the corporation via research and product development.
An additional argument against golden leashes exists. The fear is
that hedge-fund-nominated directors would remain partial to the hedge fund
after a successful election. Corporations fear their independence would be
jeopardized because of the compensation packages provided by the hedge
fund. Partiality, as might be imagined, produces the risk that hedge fund
directors will engage in strategies that are beneficial to the hedge fund but
detrimental to the corporation (such as the myopic strategies discussed
above). 149 On the other hand, Jana Partners points to contract law. As the
hedge fund agreed to the package, it could not back out of the agreement.1
5 0
Therefore, the nominees are not "beholden to the hedge fund."''
144 Ben Dummett & Chester Dawson, Agrium Defeats Jana Bid for Board Seats,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2013, 5:46 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014241278873240503045784128819339
19870.
145 Gelles, supra note 142.
146 Id.
147 See discussion supra Part III.D.
148 See discussion supra Part III.D.
149 See discussion supra Part III.D.
150 Davidoff, supra note 135.
151 Id.
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VI. EXPLORATION OF THESIS
1. Defenses Against Shareholder Activism
Implementing bylaws prohibiting activists from nominating and
paying directors would be an unnecessary step at this point in time. Certain
defenses are already available to a target corporation. For example,
corporations may insulate board members by creating a staggered board.
52
Staggered boards prevent shareholders from removing a majority of the
board at any given time.1 53 Thus, majority shareholders can ward off
tumultuous minority uprisings through corporate governance structuring at
one proxy vote. It has been argued, "the staggered board thus serves as a
powerful antitakeover device and 'entrenches' the board, unduly protecting
it from shareholder influence. Directors will instead look out for themselves
and management instead of shareholders."'
54
These boards, however, are becoming less prevalent-at least for
companies that are already public. 55 Nonetheless, the option does remain
for entrepreneurs who are taking their company public. In fact, "[a]ccording
to FactSet SharkRepellent, 86.4 percent of the companies going public [in
2012] had a staggered board."'' 56 Companies going public have even written
provisions into their bylaws requiring an eighty percent vote to remove the
staggering structure. 157 A corporate governance provision such as this
makes it much more difficult for hedge fund activists to gain a substantial
amount of board influence.158 At least in theory, entrenching the board of
directors makes it much more difficult for activists to exert their power. 5 9
Directors should be less susceptible to outside influence if they enjoy a fair
amount of future stability as a member of the board. 60 More of these anti-
takeover defenses exist, rendering the bylaw in question an unnecessary
change at this time.
16
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2014 Trimming the Hedges: 169
Why the Adoption of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen and Katz's Anti-golden Leash Bylaw is Ill-advised
Martin Lipton provides a more in-depth strategy to ward off hedge
fund activists. 162 Lipton advises the target to create a team of two to five
officers, a lawyer, investment banker, proxy-soliciting firm and a public-
relations firm to deal with the activist.163 The team should continuously
engage in meetings and become familiar with the types of activism usually
employed by the hedge fund.' 64 Among other things, Lipton advises the
target's board and the team to oversee shareholder relations, review its
capital return policy and "[p]roactively address reasons for any shortfall
versus peer company benchmarks; anticipate key questions and challenges
from analysts and activists, and be prepared with answers. 16
5
Regardless of the defenses, the debate about bylaws prohibiting
hedge funds from directly compensating their directors continues. Recently,
three directors at Provident Financial Holdings Inc. voted to approve these
bylaws prohibiting the golden leash. 166 Unsurprisingly, activists involved in
Provident Financial are currently calling out those three directors and are
hoping to vote them out. 167 The golden leash critics claim activist-bonus
payments paid to directors compromises their independence by aligning
them with the shareholders paying such fees-namely, the hedge funds
themselves. 168 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz LLP (Martin Lipton's firm)
released a memo enumerating specific threats caused by the golden leash.
69
The memo noted that these compensation arrangements pose a number of
threats, including:
" undermining Board prerogatives to set director pay and
select the timeframe over which corporate goals are to be
achieved;
" creating a multi-tiered, dysfunctional Board in which a
subset of directors are compensated and motivated
significantly differently from other directors;
* creating economic incentives to take the corporation in
the specified direction, and within the timeframe, that
would trigger outsized compensation, whether or not
162 See generally Lipton, supra note 8.
163 Id. at 2.
164 id.165 Id.
166 David Benoit & Joann S. Lublin, 'Golden Leash'Payments Fuel Debate, WALL
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169 Martin Lipton, Bylaw Protection Against Dissident Director
Conflict/Enrichment Schemes, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (May 10, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/05/10/bylaw-
protection-against-dissident-director-conflictenrichment-schemes/.
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doing so would be in the best interests of all
shareholders, would engender inappropriate and
excessive risk, or would sacrifice long-term value for
short-term gain;
" opening a schism between the personal interests of
directors who stand to benefit in the short-term from the
special compensation scheme and the interests of
shareholders with a longer-term investment horizon;
" creating poisonous conflicts in the boardroom by
creating a subclass of directors who have a significant
monetary inventive to sell the corporation or manage it
to attain the highest possible stock price in the short-run;
" and introducing unnecessary and problematic complexity
and conflicts in strategic reviews and calling into
question those directors' ability to satisfy their fiduciary
duties. 7 °
According to the memo, Columbia School of Law Professor John C.
Coffee, Jr. wrote that "third-party bonuses create the wrong incentives,
fragment the board and imply a shift toward both the short-term and higher
risk," and UCLA Professor Stephen Bainbridge concurred, saying, "[I]f this
nonsense is not illegal, it ought to be."' 17 1 The memo further provides
specific language for a bylaw:
No person shall qualify for service as a director of the
Corporation if he or she is a party to any compensatory,
payment or other financial agreement, arrangement or
understanding with any person or entity other than the
Corporation, or has received any such compensation or
other payment from any person or entity other than the
Corporation, in each case in connection with candidacy or
service as a director of the Corporation; provided that
agreements providing only for indemnification and/or
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses in connection
with candidacy as a director (but not, for the avoidance of
doubt, in connection with service as a director) and any
pre-existing employment agreement a candidate has with
his or her employer (not entered into in contemplation of
the employer's investment in the Corporation or such
employee's candidacy as a director), shall not be
disqualifying under this bylaw. 72
170 id.
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2014 Trimming the Hedges: 171
Why the Adoption of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen and Katz's Anti-golden Leash Bylaw is Ill-advised
Notably, this suggested bylaw does not prohibit hedge fund
activists from nominating directors, nor does it prohibit hedge funds from
indemnifying and reimbursing directors for any campaign costs.
17 3
Wachtell's bylaws seem to allow for the more "customary compensation"'
174
structures hedge funds typically create. Examples of these acceptable
compensation arrangements include those paid by Glenview Capital
Partners LP and Starboard Value LP. These hedge funds paid director-
nominees $100,000 and $20,000, respectively. 175 Starboard Value's
nominees used the cash to purchase stock in the corporation itself.'
76
The memo concludes by encouraging corporations to adopt this
prophylactic measure. 177 Around "twenty-six companies have adopted
bylaws" closely mirroring the language contained in Wachtell's memo,
including Provident Financial.178 Interestingly, Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), the largest U.S. proxy adviser, recommended that
shareholders oppose the reelection of the three Provident Financial directors
that voted to adopt the anti-golden leash bylaws. 79 ISS's recommendation
to oppose those directors is good news. It exemplifies the hesitancy
warranted given the potential consequences. According to Patrick McGurn,
ISS's special counsel, ISS also disagreed with the fact that Provident
implemented the bylaw without shareholder approval and because the board
failed to present a compelling explanation. 180
However, until quantitative evidence emerges showing a negative
correlation between activism and long-term corporate health, the bylaw
itself poses a problem that may outweigh its benefits. It is inarguable that
golden leashes provide great economic incentives to directors. But such
incentives are not necessarily all negative. Indeed, these golden leashes can
bring in competent directors otherwise unwilling to take on the headaches
inevitably involved with sitting on a corporation's board.1
81
This point is simple and capitalistic to its core. Arguably, the most
competent people with the greatest experience and knowledge are likely
highly-paid businesspersons. As these businesspersons are likely already
overworked and overstretched, there needs to be a significant incentive to
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put in the extra hours a board membership requires. What better incentive is.
there than additional monetary compensation? According to The Wall Street
Journal, ISS was wary that "the Provident bylaw and the broad restrictions
on compensation could lead to the exclusion of high-quality individuals
from the board." 182 It is worth noting that, to date, ISS has not formally
issued its stance on golden leashes.
Additionally, the golden leash compensation is tied into positive
corporate performance so the directors are only additionally compensated if
the target corporation performs well. Because the most conclusive
quantitative data available indicates that hedge fund activism results in
positive corporate performance, these bylaws could inhibit the economic
growth they are seeking to protect.
183
Keeping in mind that, currently, no substantial quantitative data
exists suggesting that hedge fund activism is poisonous for corporate
America, it seems plausible that bylaws prohibiting these golden leashes
could do more harm than good. Indeed, as mentioned, simply announcing a
shareholder activist has taken a stake in the target company produces
approximately a six percent increase in stock price.' 84 Additionally, the
Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang data found that target corporations also enjoy
long-term value at least five years after the initial stake. 8 5 As the most
conclusive data available to date, the Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang findings
should be given significant credence.
As it appears shareholder activity positively affects target
companies in both the short- and long-term, it would be imprudent to
implement the bylaws without further investigation. Given that the most
conclusive econometric analysis weighs heavily in favor of shareholder
activism, placing undue obstacles in the way could unnecessarily negatively
affect capital markets. For these reasons, corporations should resist
adopting the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz bylaw. Adoption of the
bylaw should only occur if and when more conclusive econometric analysis
reveals hedge fund activism reduces a target corporation's long-term value.
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